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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 Michael Sean Harrison appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon his conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance, heroin.  
On appeal, Harrison challenges the district court’s order denying his motion to 
suppress.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
At approximately 5:00 a.m. Officer Harrison1 was dispatched to Walmart 
for a “shoplifting call.”  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 7, L. 9 – p. 8, L. 4.)  Officer Harrison 
arrived at the Walmart a few minutes later.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 5-7.)  
Dispatch informed Officer Harrison that a female had stolen merchandise from 
the store and the female was in a black Subaru in the parking lot.  (1/26/15 Tr., 
p. 8, L. 21 – p. 9, L. 25.)  Dispatch told Officer Harrison the Subaru was parked 
approximately eight slots away from the front entrance and gave the Idaho 
license plate.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 8-16.)   
Dispatch also informed Officer Harrison that there was a male suspect still 
inside the store and described the male suspect as being in his thirties and 
wearing a black hooded sweatshirt and black shorts.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 8, L. 21 – p. 
10, L. 7.)  The Walmart manager believed the male suspect was getting ready to 
do a “cart push.”  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 17-22.)  A “cart push” is where someone 
                                            
1 Both the primary officer and the appellant share the same last name – 
Harrison.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 5-7.)  The appellant will be referred to as 
“Harrison” and the primary officer as “Officer Harrison.”   
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puts merchandise into a cart and exits the store without paying for the 
merchandise.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 10, L. 23 – p. 11, L. 2.)  Dispatch informed Officer 
Harrison that the male suspect was about to exit the store.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 11, 
Ls. 3-6.)   
 Officer Harrison identified the black Subaru and pulled in behind it.  
(1/26/15 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 7-20.)  Officer Harrison could not clearly see the female in 
the black Subaru because the female was “sitting remarkably low” and 
“appeared she was almost on the floorboard.”  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 11, L. 21 – p. 12, 
L. 2.)  However, Officer Harrison could see the female’s head moving from the 
left to right and he could see her arms moving, “[b]ut because she was lower 
than what you would expect someone that was just normally seated in the seat 
to be, it was hard to make out what she was doing.” (1/26/15 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 4-15.)  
 Officer Harrison exited his vehicle and was preparing to make contact with 
the female in the Subaru when he was advised that the male suspect was 
leaving the store.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 7-12.)  Officer Harrison then saw a 
male matching the suspect’s description coming out of the store.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 
13, Ls. 1-4.)  The male suspect was later identified as Harrison.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 
16, L. 24 – p. 17, L. 11.)     
 Officer Harrison saw Harrison a few feet outside of Walmart carrying two 
shopping bags.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 1-20.)  Officer Harrison asked Harrison to 
come over.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 13, L. 24 – p. 14, L. 10.)  Officer Harrison’s backup 
had not yet arrived, and Officer Harrison was alone and he could not tell what the 
female in the Subaru was doing.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 3-10.)  Harrison came 
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over and Officer Harrison explained they had received a report that Harrison and 
the female in the Subaru had been shoplifting.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 14, L. 11 – p. 15, 
L. 5.)  Officer Harrison also explained that he needed to pat search Harrison for 
weapons.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 1-5.)   
Officer Harrison asked Harrison if he could check him for weapons.   (Ex. 
1 at 1:03 to 1:07.)  Officer Harrison asked:  “Hey I’m going to make sure you 
don’t have any weapons, ok?”  (Ex. 1 at 1:03 to 1:07.)  Harrison responded, 
“Alright. Fine.”  (Ex. 1 at 1:03 to 1:07.)  As Officer Harrison was pat searching 
Harrison, Sergeant Mealer arrived on scene and Harrison started yelling at the 
female in the Subaru.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 7-23.)  Because Harrison was 
agitated and yelling, Officer Harrison detained Harrison in handcuffs.  (Id.)  
Officer Harrison informed Harrison that Harrison was only being detained and 
was not under arrest.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 18, L. 24 – p. 19, L. 5.)  During the pat 
search, Officer Harrison felt several objects in Harrison’s pockets.  (1/26/15 Tr., 
p. 19, Ls. 6-13.)  The following exchange then took place:  
Officer Harrison:  What’s in your pocket here?  
 
Harrison: Change and stuff like that.  
  
Officer Harrison: K.  You mind if I check?  Make sure there is no 
stolen merchandise or anything?” 
 
Harrison: Yeah, man.  Fine.  
 
(Ex. 1 at 2:14 to 2:22.)   
Officer Harrison asked Harrison if he could remove the items from 
Harrison’s pockets.  (Id.; 1/26/15 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 6-13.)  Harrison stated, “Yes” or 
“Yeah.”  (Id.; 1/26/15 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 6-13)  Officer Harrison removed a clear 
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plastic bag containing two brown rocks that were later identified as heroin.  
(11/7/14 Tr., p. 10, L. 24 – p. 11, L. 13, p. 13, L. 8 – p. 14, L. 11.)   
The state charged Harrison with felony possession of a controlled 
substance, heroin.  (R., pp. 35-36.)  Harrison filed a motion to suppress and 
argued that the officer’s initial seizure of Harrison and subsequent searches were 
unlawful.  (R., pp. 44-58.)  The state responded.  (R., pp. 62-78.)  The district 
court held a hearing on Harrison’s motion to suppress and Officer Harrison 
testified.  (R., pp. 79-81.)   
After Officer Harrison’s testimony, the district court made factual findings 
and denied Harrison’s motion to suppress.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 47, L. 2 – p. 56, L. 
21; R., pp. 82-83.)  The district court determined that Officer Harrison had 
reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain Harrison because he was involved in 
the suspected theft at Walmart.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 52, Ls. 13-17.)   
The district court then determined that the pat search did not directly lead 
to the discovery of evidence.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 53, Ls. 2-6.)  Because there was 
not a direct nexus between the pat search and the discovery of evidence, the 
district court did not make any conclusions about whether the pat search was 
justified.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 53, Ls. 2-16.)  The district court held that it was Officer 
Harrison’s request to empty Harrison’s pockets, and Harrison’s consent to that 
request, that led to the discovery of evidence.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 53, Ls. 17-22.)   
However, this pat-down search did not directly lead to the 
discovery of evidence.  This pat-down search led to further 
questions.  So the Court specifically finds that there is not a direct 





 Officer Harrison could just as easily have asked Mr. Harrison 
if he could empty his pockets or look in his pockets without the pat-
down search.  The pat down search does not inexorably lead to 
Officer Harrison asking the consent to empty the pockets. 
 
So the Court need make no conclusion about whether there 
was evidence to support the pat-down search because the Court 
finds there is not what we might call an exclusive nexus between 
the pat down and the ultimate search of the pockets.  
 
 What did lead to the ultimate search of the pockets was 
Officer Harrison asking Mr. Harrison if Officer Harrison could empty 
the pockets of the suspect to see if there was, among other things,  
stolen items in … the pockets, and it turned out to be contraband 
there. 
 
(1/26/15 Tr., p. 53, Ls. 2-22.)   
The district court thoroughly examined all factors laid out by State v. 
Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 137 P.3d 481 (Ct. App. 2006), and held that the state 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Harrison consented to the 
search of his pockets, and his consent was not the product of police coercion.  
(1/26/15 Tr., p. 54, L. 6 – p. 56, L. 6.) 
[Officer Harrison] was polite. Assertive as he needed to be.  
And that his demeanor was one that did not overbear the will or Mr. 
Harrison to voluntarily or freely give that consent.  The Court in all 
of the factors that it analyzes finds that the state proves by a 
preponderance that this was a free and voluntary consent given by 
Mr. Harrison and that the items seized from Mr. Harrison’s pocket 
were the subject of an exception to the warrant requirement, that 
being a free and voluntarily [sic] consent.  
 
(1/26/15 Tr., p. 55, L. 22 – p. 56, L. 6.)   
 
 The district court additionally found that exclusion of the evidence was not 
warranted because this was “just very good police work” and the purposes of the 
exclusionary rule would not be served by excluding the evidence discovered.  
(1/26/15 Tr., p. 56, Ls. 7-17.)   
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 You know, another factor that the Court determines in all of 
these situations is the exclusionary rule really is designed to 
instruct the police or to some degree punish them for conduct that 
the Court finds to be illegal conduct or conduct that violates certain 
rights and constitutional provisions that we have.  The Court finds 
this to have been just very good police work.  It just looked like 
good police work to the Court done properly.  So there would be no 
reason to exclude that, given what the Court finds to be good and 
reasonable police work. 
 
(1/26/15 Tr., p. 56, Ls. 7-17.)   
 
Harrison subsequently pled guilty to felony possession of a controlled 
substance, but reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his 
motion to suppress.  (R., pp. 102-108, 113-116.)  The district court sentenced 
Harrison to five years with three years fixed and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp. 





Harrison states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Harrison’s motion to 
suppress? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Harrison failed to show the district court erred when it denied his 





Harrison Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Denied His 
Motion To Suppress 
 
A. Introduction 
 Harrison argues his initial detention was unlawful because, he claims, 
Officer Harrison did not have reasonable articulable suspicion to detain him.  
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-10.)  Specifically Harrison claims there was no 
evidence that he shoplifted.  (Id.)  Harrison is incorrect.  The Walmart manager 
reported both a male and female suspect for shoplifting and Officer Harrison was 
responding to this report.  (See 1/26/15 Tr., p. 8, L. 21 – p. 9, L. 13, p. 10, Ls. 17-
22.)   
 Harrison additionally argues that Officer Harrison did not have reasonable 
suspicion that Harrison was armed and dangerous and, thus, the pat search was 
unlawful.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-12.)  Harrison further argues that since his 
consent to search his pockets was irrevocably intertwined with the unlawful pat 
search, his consent was invalid.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-14.)  While the district 
court did not rule on the lawfulness of the pat search, the video evidence 
demonstrates that Harrison consented to Officer Harrison’s pat search, and thus 
the pat search was not unlawful.  (See Ex. 1 at 1:03 to 1:07.)   
 Finally, Harrison claims the district court erred when it held that Harrison 
consented to the search of his pockets.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-16.)  The 
district court correctly applied the relevant factors and held that Officer Harrison 
did not coerce Harrison and Harrison’s consent was voluntary.  On appeal, 
Harrison has failed to show the district court erred.   
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B. Standard Of Review 
 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the appellate court] accepts the 
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the 
court] freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as 
found.”  State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005).  
 
C. The District Court Did Not Err When It Held That Officer Harrison Had 
Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion To Detain Harrison 
 
Based upon the information relayed from the Walmart manager, Officer 
Harrison had reasonable articulable suspicion to detain Harrison.  “An 
investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts 
which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be 
engaged in criminal activity.”  State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 
1220,1223 (Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted).  “The justification for an 
investigative detention is evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances then 
known to the officer.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
At approximately 5:00 a.m., Officer Harrison was dispatched to Walmart 
for a “shoplifting call.”  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 7, L. 9 – p. 8, L. 4.)  Dispatch informed 
Officer Harrison that a female had stolen merchandise from the store and was in 
a black Subaru in the parking lot.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 8, L. 21 – p. 9, L. 25.)  
Dispatch informed Officer Harrison that there was a male suspect still inside the 
store and described the male suspect.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 8, L. 21 – p. 10, L. 7.)  
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Dispatch informed Officer Harrison that the male suspect was about to exit the 
store.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 3-6.)   
The district court determined that Officer Harrison had reasonable, 
articulable suspicion to believe that Harrison was involved in the theft at the 
Walmart.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 52, Ls. 13-17.)   
But the information that he had was that the crime had been 
committed; the theft of a pair of pants.  That Mr. Harrison and the 
woman had been together in the store at the place where the crime 
was committed, and were coming to the same location where the 
woman had been found seated in the car that – in other words, to 
Officer Harrison had reasonable and articulable suspicion to 
believe that these people had been involved in the theft.  
Notwithstanding the fact that he was advised that Mr. Harrison had 
paid for the items that he was carrying out in the bags to that car.  
 
 It doesn’t have to – there doesn’t have to be reasonable and 
articulable suspicion that Mr. Harrison had, in fact, committed an 
offense but that he was involved with someone who had.  Did he 
know something about it?  Was he aiding and abetting in it?  Did 
he have information about it?  The status quo needed to be 
maintained while that preliminary investigation into that shoplifting 
event was conducted.   
 
And the Court finds that there were reasonable and 
articulable suspicions to support Officer Harrison detaining Mr. 
Harrison.  It was reasonable for Officer Harrison to handcuff Mr. 
Harrison, given the little bit of the raising agitation that Mr. Harrison 
had. 
 
(1/26/15 Tr., p. 51, L. 19 – p. 52, L. 17.)   
On appeal, Harrison argues that the district court erred when it 
determined that Officer Harrison had reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain 
Harrison.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8.)  Harrison argues the district court held 
that “an officer does not have ‘to articulate specific facts with respect to each 
individual, that he suspects each individual has committed an offense.’” 
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(Appellant’s brief, p. 7 (emphasis in original) (citing 1/26/15 Tr., p. 51, Ls. 15-
18).)  Harrison also argues that because Officer Harrison was informed that 
Harrison did not do a “cart push” there was no reason for his detention.  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)  Harrison’s argument ignores the court’s finding that 
there were articulable facts that Harrison committed a crime; specifically it was 
reasonable for Officer Harrison to believe that Harrison was “aiding and abetting” 
the theft.  (See 1/26/15 Tr., p. 51, L. 19 – p. 52, L. 17.)  A Walmart manager 
reported a male and female were suspected of shoplifting, and dispatch relayed 
that information to Officer Harrison.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 8, L. 21 – p. 9, L. 13, p. 10, 
Ls. 17-22.)  When a tip is received from a known citizen-informant, the tip is 
generally sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.  State v. Bishop, 146 
Idaho 804, 812, 203 P.3d 1203, 1211 (2009).  It was reasonable for Officer 
Harrison to rely upon the report of the Walmart manager to detain Harrison.   
Harrison also argues that the district court’s factual finding that “‘Mr. 
Harrison and the woman had been together in the store at the place where the 
crime was committed’” was clearly erroneous.  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 9 (citing 
1/26/15 Tr., p. 51, Ls. 21-22).)  Harrison argues Officer Harrison’s testimony 
“makes clear that dispatch did not tell Officer Harrison that Mr. Harrison and Ms. 
Morales [the woman] had been seen in the store together, much less that Mr. 
Harrison had something to do with Ms. Morales shoplifting the pants.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10 (footnote omitted).)  Harrison further argues that 
Officer Harrison just “assumed” Harrison and the female were together in the 
store.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) 
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Harrison’s argument is not supported by the record.  Harrison’s argument 
focuses on this portion of Officer Harrison’s testimony: 
Q. Do you know why the manager at Wal-Mart believed this 
suspect was about to do a cart push? 
 
A. I didn’t have that information at the time other than he had 
merchandise in the cart and was headed towards an exit.  That’s all 
I knew.  
 
Q. Okay.  And after you received that information from dispatch 
as you’re exiting your vehicle that they believe he paid for the 





Q. Describe why you had those concerns. 
 
A. My concerns were that they were together because that’s 
what had been reported to me that there was a male and a female 
subject.  She was in the passenger seat which led me to think the 
driver was somewhere.  I made the assumption, I suppose, that the 
driver was more likely than not to be the male suspect that was 
given to me.  And then also just based on prior experience of 
people that have committed theft via shoplifting into [sic] store and 
still paid for some merchandise.   
 
(1/26/15 Tr., p. 23, L. 9 – p. 24, L. 3.)  Contrary to Harrison’s argument on 
appeal, Officer Harrison repeatedly testified that dispatch had reported both a 
female and a male were suspected of shoplifting.   
 Q. What information did you have at the time that you arrived at Wal-
Mart? 
 
A. That a female had stolen merchandise from the store and 
she was currently in a Subaru in the parking lot, the passenger 
side, and that there was a male suspect still inside the store. 
 
Q. And how did you receive that information? 
 




Q. And are you aware of how dispatch received that 
information? 
 
A. They were speaking to a reporting party who was a manager 
in the store. 
… 
 
Q. So specifically you received information relating to a female 




(1/26/15 Tr., p. 8, L. 21 – p. 9, L. 13.) 
 
Q. Now, the information you received about the suspected 
shoplifting, what specifically was that? 
 
A. That the female had stolen merchandise.  I believed at the 
time I was told it was pants.  And that the male suspect was, in the 
opinion of the reporting party, getting ready to do a cart push. 
 
(1/26/15 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 17-22.)  Officer Harrison explained to Harrison that both 
Harrison and the female were reported as shoplifters.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 1-
5.)  The only “assumption” Officer Harrison made was the “assumption” that 
Harrison was the driver of the Subaru because the female was in the passenger 
seat of the Subaru.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 23, L. 19 – p. 24, L. 3.)   
 In addition, prior to detaining Harrison, Harrison was walking towards 
Officer Harrison and the black Subaru, where the female was in the passenger 
seat.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 9-11, p. 29, Ls. 21-25.)  Contrary to Harrison’s 
argument, the district court’s factual finding that it was reasonable for Officer 
Harrison to believe that Harrison and the female were together in the Walmart is 
supported by substantial evidence.  This factual finding supports the district 
court’s conclusion that Officer Harrison had reasonable, articulable suspicion to 
detain Harrison.   
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D. It Is Irrelevant Whether The Initial Pat Search Was Irrevocably Intertwined 
With Harrison’s Consent To Search His Pockets Because Harrison 
Consented To The Initial Pat Search  
 
 After the district court found that Officer Harrison had reasonable, 
articulable suspicion to detain Harrison, the district court examined the pat 
search and determined that the pat search did not lead to the discovery of 
evidence:   
And the Court comes to the second level of analysis then as 
to whether the pat down or the frisk was supported by law.  The 
Court is not going to come to a conclusion as to whether the pat 
down or the frisk was supported by law.  The Court understands 
that in order to conduct a pat down or frisk, there needs to be 
information that leads a reasonably prudent officer to believe the 
person being patted down was armed or was dangerous.  
 
 However, this pat-down search did not directly lead to the 
discovery of evidence.  This pat-down search led to further 
questions.  So the Court specifically finds that there is not a direct 
nexus between the pat-down search and the ultimate discovery of 
evidence.  
 
 Officer Harrison could just as easily have asked Mr. Harrison 
if he could empty his pockets or look in his pockets without the pat-
down search.  The pat down search does not inexorably lead to 
Officer Harrison asking the consent to empty the pockets.   
 
 So the Court need make no conclusion about whether there 
was evidence to support the pat-down search because the Court 
finds there is not what we might call an exclusive nexus between 
the pat down and the ultimate search of the pockets. 
 
(1/26/15 Tr., p. 52, L. 18 – p. 53, L. 16.)  The district court then analyzed the 
relevant consent factors and determined Harrison consented to the search of his 
pockets.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 53, L. 23 – p. 56, L. 6.)   
 On appeal, Harrison argues the district court erred when it determined 
that there was not a nexus between the pat search and the search of the pockets 
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which resulted in the discovery of the contraband.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-
14.)  In support of his argument, Harrison cites to State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 
11 P.3d 489 (Ct. App. 2000).  In Kerley, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that if 
the consent was irrevocably intertwined with an unlawful frisk, then the consent 
may not purge the “taint of the unlawful frisk.”  Kerley, 134 at 875, 11 P.3d at 
494; see also State v. Baxter, 144 Idaho 672, 681-682, 168 P.3d 1019, 1028-
1029 (Ct. App. 2007).  The state agrees Kerley is controlling.  Harrison 
consented to the search of his pockets only after Officer Harrison frisked him.  
Therefore, whether the evidence discovered as a result of that search is “tainted” 
depends on whether the frisk itself was lawful.   
Here, the district court explicitly did not determine whether the frisk was 
lawful.  (1/26/15 Tr., p. 52, Ls. 20-22 (“The Court is not going to come to a 
conclusion as to whether the pat down or the frisk was supported by law.”), p. 53, 
Ls. 12-16.)  Harrison argues that frisk was unlawful because Officer Harrison 
“had no reason to believe that Mr. Harrison was ‘armed and presently 
dangerous.’”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 12 (citations omitted).)  Even assuming the 
truth of this assertion, suppression is not required.  Application of the law to the 
video evidence admitted at the suppression hearing shows Harrison consented 
to the initial pat search and thus the initial pat search was not unlawful.   
Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement.  A search conducted 
with consent that was freely given is such an exception. See, e.g., State v. 
Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 370, 347 P.3d 1025, 1031 (Ct. App. 2015) (citations 
omitted).  Officer Harrison asked Harrison if he could check him for weapons.   
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(Ex. 1 at 1:03 to 1:07.)  Officer Harrison asked:  “Hey I’m going to make sure you 
don’t have any weapons, ok?”  (Ex. 1 at 1:03 to 1:07.)  Harrison responded, 
“Alright. Fine.”  (Ex. 1 at 1:03 to 1:07.)  While the district court did not make any 
findings regarding the lawfulness of initial pat search, this video evidence shows 
that Harrison consented to be pat searched for weapons.2   
Because the record shows Harrison freely and voluntarily consented to be 
pat searched, the pat search was constitutionally reasonable and did not “taint” 
or otherwise render “ineffective” Harrison’s consent to the search of his pockets.  
Harrison’s arguments to the contrary are without merit.   
 
E. Harrison Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Finding That 
Harrison Gave Consent To Officer Harrison To Search His Pockets 
 
The district court examined the evidence and Officer Harrison’s testimony 
and applying the factors enumerated in State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 137 P.3d 
481 (Ct. App. 2006), found that Harrison gave free and voluntary consent to 
search his pockets:   
 What did lead to the ultimate search of the pockets was 
Officer Harrison asking Mr. Harrison if Officer Harrison could empty 
the pockets of the suspect to see if there was, among other things,  
stolen items in … the pockets, and it turned out to be contraband 
there. 
 
 So on that issue of whether there was a consent to the 
search, the state has the burden of proving, as it had in the 
                                            
2 The district court did make factual findings and legal conclusions regarding 
Harrison’s subsequent consent to search his pockets.  (See 1/26/15 Tr., p. 53, L. 
17 – p. 56, L. 6.)  The district court’s factual findings and legal conclusions 
regarding Harrison’s consent to search his pockets could also be applied to 
Harrison’s consent to the initial pat search because the factual situation 
surrounding both are similar if not the same.  (See Ex. 1 at 1:03 to 1:07, at 2:14 




detention, the state had the burden of proving there was a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion to initially detain Mr. Harrison.  
The state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that any 
consent that was given was done freely and voluntarily and not the 
subject of police coercion.   
 
 The Court is certainly aware of the State versus Jaborra 
factors to consider at 143 Idaho 94, a 2006 Court of Appeals case.  
Those are not exhaustive factors but those factors are instructive to 
the Court and they include an analysis of whether there was an 
overwhelming number of officers at the scene; the Court finds there 
was not.  There were two officers there to handle two potential 
suspects or even one suspect and one involved person or person 
with information.   
 
 The Court considers the location and the conditions.  This 
was in a public area, in the parking lot of a normally busy retail 
center, but it was at a time in the morning when it was not a lot of 
foot traffic or car traffic there.  Somewhat remote location, but not 
as if it was out of the view of public or off in some secluded place or 
some place that would cause an individual to feel like they were 
being held incommunicado from others in our society.  That’s not 
the situation here.  It wasn’t an inherently coercive location or 
condition.  It was a lighted parking lot.  The officers – it looked like 
his vehicle lights were on as well.  There were people outside 
spoke [sic] it was done in a public setting.   
 
 Officer Harrison did not take and withhold any identification 
from – his driver’s license from Mr. Harrison.  He clearly advised 
him “You are not under arrest.  You are being detained until we can 
figure out what happened in this suspected shoplifting.”  So he was 
not advised that he was free to go, but he was not in a situation 
where the officer’s action and conduct were coercive in nature.   
 
 He was not – Mr. Harrison was not advised of his right to 
refuse consent.  The case law is clear that police need not advise 
that.  And that factor alone does not make consent an invalid or an 
involuntarily [sic] consent.   
 
 The Court also makes the finding that it observed both in the 
actions that the Court saw in Exhibit 1 and in the tone of voice used 
by Officer Harrison in Exhibit 1, that it was a reasonable tone of 
voice.  There were reasonable actions. He was in control of the 




 He was polite. Assertive as he needed to be.  And that his 
demeanor was one that did not overbear the will or Mr. Harrison to 
voluntarily or freely give that consent.  The Court in all of the 
factors that it analyzes finds that the state proves by a 
preponderance that this was a free and voluntary consent given by 
Mr. Harrison and that the items seized from Mr. Harrison’s pocket 
were the subject of an exception to the warrant requirement, that 
being a free and voluntarily [sic] consent. 
 
(1/26/15 Tr., p. 53, L. 23 – p. 56, L. 6.)  On appeal, Harrison does not argue that 
the district court utilized the wrong law, but instead simply disagrees with the 
district court’s conclusions regarding the video evidence.  (See Appellant’s brief, 
p. 16.)  Harrison argues that because Officer Harrison gave instructions to 
Harrison that Harrison’s consent to search his pockets was not voluntary.  (See 
id.)  Harrison does not cite any law that supports this conclusion.  Most of the 
instructions of which Harrison complains were instructions related to Officer 
Harrison’s lawful detention of Harrison.  “[A]n investigative detention not rising to 
the level of an arrest does not, standing alone, demonstrate coercion.”  State v. 
Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 302-03, 912 P.2d 664, 670-71 (Ct. App. 1995).  The 
district court thoroughly examined all of the Jaborra factors and determined that 
Harrison’s consent was voluntarily and freely given.  On appeal, Harrison has 





 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of 
conviction entered upon Harrison’s conditional guilty plea to possession of a 
controlled substance, heroin.   




 _/s/ Ted S. Tollefson___ 
 TED S. TOLLEFSON 
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